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Abstract 
We explore potential relationships between international economic activities and gender 
wage gaps (GWGs) using linked employer-employee data for Japan. We find evidence that 
exporting and multinational activities are associated with reduced GWGs. Domestic-owned firms 
that neither export nor invest abroad (i.e., domestic-only firms) report the largest GWG, followed 
by Japanese-owned multinational enterprises (JMNE), then by locally-owned exporters that do not 
invest abroad and finally by foreign-owned multinational enterprises (FMNE). We separate FMNE 
by mode of entry and confirm that FMNE established by greenfield investment deviate more than 
FMNE established by merger and acquisition from domestic-only firms in terms of wages. 
Greenfield-born FMNE are associated with the smallest GWG and largest gender-neutral wage 
premium among the firm types. The estimated GWG among Greenfield-born FMNE is almost 12 
percentage-points lower than the 26.8 percent prevailing at domestic-only firms. 
 
Keywords: gender wage gap; wage premium; exporters; multinational enterprises 
JEL Classification: F14, F16, J31 
 
 ∗Corresponding author; Department of Economics, University of Hawai`i. Address: 2424 Maile Way, Saunders 542, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, United States. Tel: 808-956-7521. E-mail: greaney@hawaii.edu.  
 †Faculty of Commerce, Chuo University, and Research Associate, The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). Address: 742-1 Higashinakano Hachioji-shi, Tokyo 192-0393 Japan. Tel: +81-42-674-3608. E-mail: a-tanaka@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp.  
 
  
 1 
1 Introduction 
“Womenomics”, a concept first articulated by Kathy Matsui, vice chair of Goldman Sachs 
Japan, and adopted by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, proposes increasing female 
employment and reducing gender pay disparities in order to achieve economic growth.1 While 
Japan has improved its female labor force participation rates and now reports a rate that exceeds 
the OECD average by over 5 percentage points,2 it has not been as successful in reducing gender-
based earnings inequality. Japan’s raw gender earnings gap of 24.5 percent was much higher than 
the OECD average of 13.2 percent in 2017.3 Only South Korea (34.6 percent) and Estonia (28.3 
percent) reported higher gender earnings gaps than Japan.4 
International activities, both trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), have the potential 
for impacting a country’s gender earnings gap. We seek to explore how Japan’s gender pay gap 
may be affected by exporting and multinational activities. Exposure to foreign markets and foreign 
gender norms through exporting and FDI outflows and inflows has the potential to impact male 
and female workers differently. Using linked employer-employee data for the manufacturing sector, 
we find suggestive evidence that international activities contribute to reducing Japan’s gender 
wage gap (GWG). We find that foreign-owned multinational enterprises (FMNE) report the 
smallest GWG, followed by locally-owned firms that export but do not invest abroad, then by 
Japanese-owned MNE (JMNE) and finally by domestic-only firms (i.e., domestic-owned firms 
that neither export nor invest abroad). 
 
1 Matsui et. al. (2014) estimate that closing the gender employment gap in Japan will produce a nearly 13 percent 
increase in GDP. 
2 Based on 2017 data with Japan’s female labor force participation rate at 69.4 percent compared with the OECD 
average of 64 percent (OECD, 2019). 
3 Gender pay gap of median monthly earnings defined as the difference between male and female median monthly 
earnings divided by male median monthly earnings for full-time employees (OECD, 2017). 
4 Estonia’s data reflects 2014, the most recent statistic available in the OECD’s online data available at: 
https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/gender-wage-gap.htm.  
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After finding that FMNE deviate the most from domestic-only firms in terms of GWGs, 
we ask whether FMNE mode of entry matters for gender wage outcomes. We propose that FMNE 
originating from greenfield investment will deviate further from domestic-only firms than FMNE 
originating from mergers and acquisitions (M&A). A Greenfield-born FMNE involves foreigners 
in setting up the human resource management (HRM) and pay systems from the firm’s 
establishment, while an M&A-born FMNE involves foreigners influencing and possibly changing 
existing HRM and pay systems.5 We find support for our hypothesis that Greenfield-born FMNE 
deviate the most from the gender wage inequality existing at domestic-only firms. Among 
majority-owned FMNE, only Greenfield-born ones are associated with significant, large 
reductions in the GWG while M&A-born FMNE do not differ significantly from domestic-only 
firms. Greenfield-born FMNE are associated with an 11.9 percentage-point smaller GWG than 
domestic-only firms that report a 26.8 percent GWG on average. Quintile regressions indicate that 
Greenfield-born FMNE deviate the most from domestic-only firms in terms of GWGs in the 
middle quintiles of the wage distribution. 
Our research relates to three strands of literature. The first is extensive research on wage 
premiums paid by exporters or by foreign-owned firms. Early research on this topic used firm-
level or plant-level data to estimate these wage premia while more recent empirical work has 
utilized matched employer-employee data in order to control for both firm characteristics and 
worker characteristics in estimating wage premia.6 While the research using matched datasets, 
 
5 For example, IBM Japan is a greenfield-born MNE (see:  https://www.ibm.com/ibm/jp/ja/history.html) while 
Nissan Motor Co. is a (minority-foreign-owned) M&A-born FMNE based on Renault’s equity links to Nissan (see:  
https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/COMPANY/PROFILE/HERITAGE/HISTORY/). 
6 Early research includes Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997, 1999) on exporter wage premia, and Aitken et al. (1996) 
and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) on MNE wage premia. More recent work using linked employer-employee data to 
examine exporter wage premia includes Frıas et al. (2018), Munch and Skaksen (2008), Schank et al. (2007), 
Schank et al. (2010), and Verhoogen (2008), while MNE wage premia are addressed using linked data in Girma and 
Gorg (2007), Heyman et al. (2007), Hijzen et al. (2013) and Martins (2011). 
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especially panel matched datasets, has improved our understanding of these globalization wage 
premia by accounting for firm and worker heterogeneity, differing conclusions have been found. 
Using quasi-experimental variation in exports due to a currency devaluation, Frías et al. (2018) 
find a large causal link between exporting and wage premia using Mexican data (i.e., a 1 percent 
increase in a plant’s export share leads to a 3 percent increase in the plant-specific wage premium). 
Heyman et al. (2007) reject the notion of wage premia paid by foreign-owned firms relative to 
domestic-owned firms using linked employer-employee data for Sweden, while Hijzen et al. 
(2013) find foreign-ownership wage premia of 1 to 6 percent using matched data for three 
developed economies (i.e., Germany, Portugal, the UK) and one developing economy (i.e., Brazil). 
A second strand of related literature has focused on the impacts of international activities 
on gender pay disparities. While several papers have examined the potential links between import 
competition and GWGs,7 we focus on how exports and multinational activities may impact the 
GWG. On this topic, the literature is quite recent and relatively sparse but a few hypotheses have 
been proposed and empirically tested. Bøler et al. (2018) propose that exporting requires more 
flexible workers who can communicate with trade partners at odd hours and/or travel 
internationally on short notice, which tends to disfavor female workers who are perceived as being 
more family-oriented and therefore less flexible. Using matched employer-employee data, they 
find that entry into exporting by Norwegian firms leads to a three-percentage-point increase in the 
GWG among college-educated workers. Juhn et al. (2014) use firm-level data for Mexico to show 
that trade-liberalization-induced exporting increased the relative wage and employment of blue-
 
7 Black and Brainerd (2004) employ the Becker (1957) model of discrimination to explain their finding that 
increased product market competition through imports reduces the ability of U.S. manufacturing firms in 
concentrated industries to gender discriminate in wages. Other studies in a similar vein have used industry-level 
evidence to examine trade liberalization effects for one or two countries mainly through import competition and 
impacts on gender wage gaps (e.g., both Seguino (2000) and Berik et al. (2004) study South Korea and Taiwan). 
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collar women because exporting firms adopted new technologies that reduced the need for 
physically demanding skills. Blue-collar men were replaced by blue-collar women and new 
production technologies. These two papers suggest that the relationship between exporting and 
GWGs may differ substantially based on the skill or education level of workers. 
Researchers also have explored the link between MNE and gender wage gaps. Oostendorp 
(2009) finds that the within-occupation GWG tends to decrease with trade and FDI in richer 
countries but no significant effects are found in poorer countries. Vahter and Masso (2019) use 
Estonian matched employer-employee data to conclude that foreign-owned firms have larger 
GWGs than locally-owned firms. They argue that the larger GWG is due to men capturing a larger 
share of MNE wage premiums. One previous study has used matched employer-employee data for 
Japan to study this issue. Ono and Odaki (2011) use matched data for 1998 to document MNE 
wage premiums and smaller GWGs within foreign-owned MNE. They suggest that FMNE may 
have an advantage in hiring career-minded Japanese women, who are under-valued by Japanese 
firms due to the seniority-wage and lifetime employment systems.8 They find a GWG of 32 percent 
in locally-owned firms, but only 21 percent in FMNE defined using a 10 percent foreign equity 
minimum to define FMNE. Our study updates and extends the work of Ono and Odaki (2011) by 
using more recent data (i.e., for 2012), by considering two different capital ownership criteria for 
defining foreign ownership (i.e., 50 percent and 10 percent) and by separating firms in our dataset 
into five different types, instead of only two types (i.e., foreign and domestic). 
A third strand of related literature examines the transmission of culture across international 
borders through economic activity. Of particular interest is the transmission of more gender-neutral 
corporate culture into a country with less gender-neutral norms. Tang and Zhang (2017) find that 
 
8 See Ono (2010) and Kambayashi and Kato (2010) for more details on Japan’s seniority wage and lifetime 
employment systems. 
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foreign affiliates in China from more gender-equal countries tend to have higher female shares of 
employment compared with foreign affiliates from less gender-equal countries. Siegal et al. (2019) 
find that FMNE are more likely to hire and/or promote female managers in Korea, while Choi and 
Greaney (2020) find that FMNE acquisitions of Korean firms result in workforce reorganization 
that favors proportionately more women in the most elite postings within a firm. They also show 
that this workforce reorganization produces productivity gains for the acquired firms. 9 Kodama et 
al. (2018) find that FMNE tend to employ proportionately more women and more female managers 
than locally-owned firms in Japan. They also find that the FMNE tend to have more family-friendly 
workplace policies, such as flextime, telecommuting, used vacation days and childcare subsidies. 
Our results complement the Kodama et al. (2018) results in that we find wage-based evidence that 
foreign-owned MNE have more gender-equal pay structures than locally-owned firms in Japan.  
We contribute to the literature in three distinctive ways. Our study is the first, to our 
knowledge, to use linked employer-employee data for Japan to examine gender-based differences 
in employee returns to both exporting and multinational enterprise activities. 10  These two 
international activities typically have been examined by separate strands of literature that seek to 
identify wage premiums, whereas we are able to directly compare and disentangle the two effects 
on wages and GWGs.11  
Second, we distinguish between domestic-owned MNE and foreign-owned MNE and find 
substantial differences in worker wages, especially for women in Japan. We find that FMNE pay 
much larger gender-neutral wage premiums than JMNE operating in Japan, and female workers 
 
9 This result relates to another strand of research that examines how culture impacts firms’ international economic 
performance through differences in management practices. See, for example, Guiso et al. (2006), Bloom and Van 
Reenan (2007) and Bloom et al. (2012). 
10 Ono and Odaki (2011) use Japanese linked employer-employee data for 1998 to examine the GWG between 
foreign-owned and locally-owned firms, but they do not address export activities nor distinguish between locally-
owned and foreign-owned MNE or between foreign-owned MNE based on entry mode. 
11 Greaney and Li (2016) also disentangle exporter and MNE wage premiums using firm-level data for China. 
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receive larger added wage premiums by working at FMNE so these firms feature the smallest 
GWGs. This implies that the “multinationality” of a firm matters in a quantitatively small way 
among Japanese-owned firms, but foreign ownership matters in a quantitatively large way in 
Japan’s labor market. 
Our third and perhaps most unique contribution is to separate FMNE based on their mode 
of entry which has not to our knowledge been previously done in the literature on FMNE wage 
premiums. This distinction allows us to test the hypothesis that mode of entry matters for the 
transmission of corporate gender norms. We propose that Greenfield-born FMNE are the most 
likely to deviate from the existing corporate gender norms in Japan,12 while other international 
firm types (i.e., M&A-born FMNE, JMNE and exporters) may be influenced by foreign gender 
norms to a lesser degree, using domestic-only firms as the reference group. Since our dataset does 
not distinguish between Greenfield-born FMNE and M&A-born FMNE, we make a unique 
contribution to the data by examining the history of each FMNE to determine whether its origin 
involved a foreign partner from the start. The advantage of separating FMNE based on mode of 
entry is it allows us to address the endogeneity problem for a specific group of foreign-owned 
firms using cross-sectional data. Smaller GWGs associated with FMNE may be due to foreign 
owners instituting a more gender-neutral pay system or due to foreign owners preferring to acquire 
local firms with more gender-neutral pay systems already in place. In order to conclude that foreign 
ownership drives gender wage outcomes, rather than vice versa, we separately identify FMNE 
established through greenfield investment. For these firms, foreign influence occurs from firm 
establishment so we can reasonably interpret the direction of causality as flowing from foreign 
ownership to gender wage outcomes. 
 
12 This argument assumes that most FMNE come from countries more gender equal than Japan. Statistics to support 
this assumption are presented in the next paragraph. 
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Japan is an ideal country to use for this study for several reasons. First, its recent growth 
promotion policies include encouraging better utilization of its female labor force and enticing 
more FDI inflows so the relationship between the two should interest policymakers.13 Second, 
Japan has some unique labor market characteristics such as the lifetime employment system and 
seniority wage system that have been identified as posing barriers to women in the labor market.14 
Third, Japan has a large GWG but a relatively low level of male wage inequality, making it an 
interesting outlier among the 22 developed countries studied in Blau and Kahn (2003).15 Fourth, 
even though we cannot identify the countries of origin of the FMNE in our dataset, we can 
reasonably assume that most come from countries that are more gender-equal than Japan in terms 
of employment practices. In the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2012, Japan 
was ranked 102 out of 135 countries for Economic Participation and Opportunity.16 In 2012, the 
largest foreign investors in Japan based on FDI stock ranked well above Japan in terms of gender 
equality using the same gender gap index, with the US (ranked 8) followed by the Netherlands 
(24), France (62) and the UK (33).17 Focusing specifically on FMNE in manufacturing, European 
affiliates accounted for 61 percent of total FMNE employment, followed by North American 
affiliates with 31 percent, while Asian affiliates accounted for only 5 percent of total FMNE 
employment in 2012.18 
 
13 See Japan Revitalization Strategy:  Japan is Back, 2013, for details on Prime Minister Abe’s economic growth 
strategies involving “Promoting active participation by women” (p. 44-48) and “Activating inward direct investment 
(p. 137-138). See Hoshi and Kiyota (2019) for details and analysis of Japan’s promotion of inward FDI since 2013. 
14 See Kawaguchi (2015) and Hara (2018) on this topic. 
15 They find that compressed returns to skills (i.e., low measured male wage inequality) tend to correspond with low 
gender wage gaps among developed economies, with Japan being the exception. 
16 Japan’s ranking in the most recent WEF Gender Gap Report 2020 was 115 out of 153 countries for the same sub-
index, but we present 2012 data above to match the 2012 wage data used in our study. 
17 Japan’s inward FDI stock data obtained from the OECD (2019) database. 
18 Data from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Survey of Trends in Business Activities of Foreign 
Affiliates, 47th Survey, for fiscal year 2012, with a response rate of 60 percent. 
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We present our methodology in the next section, followed by a description of our data 
sources and summary statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical results, followed by a section on 
robustness checks. We conduct robustness checks by changing our definition of foreign ownership 
from majority-foreign-ownership to a more expansive definition that includes all firms with 10 
percent or more foreign capital ownership. Our conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 Methodology 
This study employs both ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile regression (QR) to 
estimate the Mincer (1974) wage equations.19 After investigating the wage premium using OLS, 
we conduct QR to examine wage premiums on a particular percentile of the wage distribution to 
investigate whether these premiums vary across the range of wages. For example, we examine 
whether high-wage workers obtain higher multinational wage premiums than low-wage workers 
and whether GWGs vary between high-wage and low-wage workers. QR has several attractive 
features, as explained in Koenker and Hallock (2001) and Cameron and Trivedi (2010). First, QR 
enables us to investigate the effects of a covariate on the full distribution or any particular 
percentile of the distribution, whereas OLS reveals the average relationship between the wage and 
explanatory variables. Second, QR is robust to the presence of outliers, whereas OLS regression 
is sensitive to such presence. 
First, we employ OLS and the following Mincer wage equation to examine whether 
exporters or multinationals pay higher wages than our reference group that we call “domestic-only” 
establishments (i.e., locally-owned plants that neither export nor own subsidiaries abroad): 
 
19 Ideally we would use the difference-in-differences technique to examine our research questions with panel data, 
but our linked employer-employee data is not available as a panel, as we explain in the Data section. 
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𝒍𝒏𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒑 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜸′ ∑ 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝑻𝒚𝒑𝒆𝒑𝒑 + 𝜹′ ∑ 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆 ∗ 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝑻𝒚𝒑𝒆𝒑𝒑 +𝜽′𝑬𝒔𝒕𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒑 + 𝝁′𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊𝒑.       (1) 
lnWage𝑖𝑝  is the log of hourly wage for worker i in plant p, Femalei is an indicator variable for 
female workers, and EstTypep is a vector of dummy variables for our various international 
establishment types of interest (i.e., initially, Exporter, JMNE and FMNE). In some specifications 
we replace the FMNE dummy with separate dummy variables for Greenfield-born FMNE and 
M&A-born FMNE. We control for the following establishment characteristics (EstCharp):  size 
(measured by the log of establishment employment), a headquarters dummy variable, average 
worker productivity (measured by the log of plant sales per worker), and industry and region fixed 
effects.20 We also control for individual worker characteristics (WorkerChari) that are typically 
included in a Mincer wage regression (i.e., education,21 experience, experience squared, tenure, 
and tenure squared), along with dummy variables for white-collar workers and workers hired for 
an indefinite period. The latter is used to proxy for long-term employees of Japanese firms. The 
descriptive statistics of all variables for male and female workers are presented in Appendix Table 
A1.22 
In an alternate OLS specification, we measure the international activities variables of 
interest using continuous variables. For exporting, we use the export share of total sales which 
allows us to control for exporting by local exporters and by JMNE and FMNE.23 To measure JMNE 
activities with a continuous variable, we use the log of the number of foreign subsidiaries reported 
by each firm. More foreign subsidiaries indicates greater engagement in foreign markets and 
 
20 We have 24 manufacturing industries at the 2-digit level and 47 prefectures. 
21 We include three dummy variables to indicate the highest educational attainment achieved: high school graduate, 
junior college graduate, or college graduate. 
22 Appendix tables appear online here: https://sites.google.com/site/greaneyecon/research. 
23 Note that this differs from our treatment with dummy variables in which the establishment types are mutually 
exclusive (i.e., an exporting firm is classified as a locally-owned exporter, a JMNE or a FMNE). 
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stronger potential for the transmission of more gender-equal workplace norms to filter back to 
Japan. For FMNE, the foreign ownership ratio is used as the continuous variable. The larger the 
foreign ownership ratio, the stronger the foreign influence on the workplace norms. 
Second, this study employs QR to estimate the wage premium on any particular percentile 
of the wage distribution. Using the linear programming method, we obtain the qth estimator 𝛾?̂?, 
which minimizes over 𝛾𝑞  the objective function: 
𝑸(𝜸𝒒) = ∑ 𝒒|𝒚𝒊 − 𝒙𝒊′𝜸𝒒|𝑵𝒊: 𝒚𝒊≥𝒙𝒊′𝜸 + ∑ (𝟏 − 𝒒)|𝒚𝒊 − 𝒙𝒊′𝜸𝒒|𝑵𝒊: 𝒚𝒊<𝒙𝒊𝜸                                      (𝟐)  
  
where 0 < 𝑞 < 1 , 𝑦𝑖 is the log of hourly wage and 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables. We 
divide the wage distribution into quintiles and use the same explanatory variables as were used in 
the OLS regression. The QR estimates have the advantage of being more robust to non-normal 
errors and outliers. 
3 Data and summary statistics 
3.1 Data 
To construct the matched employer–employee data, this study uses confidential data from 
three official surveys: (i) The Basic Survey on Wage Structure (2012), (ii) The Economic Census 
for Business Frame (2009), and (iii) The Economic Census for Business Activity (2012).24 We 
merge the data from these three surveys at the plant level using the common plant-level census ID. 
First, we obtain the data on most variables used in the analysis, such as worker-level wage 
and other worker-, plant-, and firm-level variables from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure, and 
construct the worker-level cross-sectional data. The Basic Survey on Wage Structure is conducted 
 
24 All three surveys are conducted as Fundamental Statistics according to Japan’s Statistics Act. 
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every year from July 1st to 31st by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW).25 The 
survey covers plants with five or more regular employees in major industries in Japan. Plants are 
selected using a uniform sampling method. Employees are also selected using a uniform sampling 
method from among the plants selected for the survey. 
Second, we merge the worker-level data with the firm-level data on foreign ownership from 
The Economic Census for Business Frame. This is a newly-created census to identify the basic 
structure of establishments and enterprises in Japan and is conducted by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (MIC).26 The 2009 census was the first one and it was conducted as 
of July 1, 2009. 
Third, we also merge the worker-level data with data on firms’ export status from The 
Economic Census for Business Activity. This is another newly-created census to investigate the 
economic activity of establishments and enterprises in all industries. The purpose of the census is 
to obtain basic information for conducting various statistical surveys.27 Using the results of the 
2009 Economic Census for Business Frame, the 2012 Economic Census for Business Activity was 
conducted by MIC and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in February 2012 to 
investigate the activities of establishments and enterprises during 2011. 
Full details on the matching procedures appear in Appendix Figure A1.28 As indicated, we 
use worker-level data and plant-level data from 2012 except for export data, which is reported in 
the 2012 Economic Census for Business Activity for 2011, and JMNE number of foreign 
subsidiaries and FMNE foreign equity shares, which are from The Economic Census for Business 
 
25 See the MHLW website (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/wage-structure.html) for more details. 
26 See the MIC website (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/e-census/index.htm) for more details. 
27 See the MIC website (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/e-census/2012/index.htm) for more details. 
28 Appendix Figure A1 is available online here: https://sites.google.com/site/greaneyecon/research. 
 12 
Frame for 2009. The matching procedure to link employees and employers is successful only for 
the 2012 data so we are restricted to using single-year cross-sectional data.29 
After constructing the linked employer–employee data through these steps, we develop a 
dataset to estimate the Mincer wage equation. This study’s procedure follows that of Kawaguchi 
(2011). In particular, we restrict our analysis to the sample of full-time workers under the age of 
60 years who work at private manufacturing firms. The reasons for these restrictions are as 
follows.30 First, we restrict our analysis to full-time workers because information on the education 
level of part-time workers is unavailable in the survey.31 Second, we drop the data on workers over 
60 years of age to address the fact that workers in Japan at the age of 60 years tend to face large 
declines in wages due mainly to mandatory retirement policies at almost all Japanese firms.32 
Lastly, we restrict our sample to manufacturing firms because we do not have export data for non-
manufacturing firms that can be matched with the employee data. 
Following Kawaguchi (2011), the monthly total wage is calculated as the sum of monthly 
wages plus one-twelfth of yearly bonuses. Then, the hourly wage used in our analysis is calculated 
as the monthly total wage divided by hours worked expressed in hundreds of Japanese yen (JPY). 
To control for the potential influence of outliers, we exclude hourly wages that fall below the 
minimum wage at the prefectural level and hourly wages that exceed the mean wage plus 10 
standard deviations. 
 
29 Kawaguchi (2011) noted the same single-year matching outcome. Note that The Basic Survey on Wage Structure 
is not a longitudinal survey so even studies that use only this data for multiple years cannot use worker-fixed-effects 
models or establishment-fixed-effects models. 
30 See Kawaguchi (2011) for more details. 
31 Full-time workers include regular (sei shain) and non-regular (hisei shain) workers, with both groups further 
divided into staff hired for an indefinite period (i.e., long-term employees) or staff hired for a definite period. 
Regular workers make up approximately 90 percent of our sample. 
32 Mandatory retirement policies were used at 93.3 percent of Japanese firms overall, and 99.8 percent of firms with 
1000 or more employees, according to the 2013 General Survey on Working Conditions conducted by the MHLW. 
Workers at such firms are expected to formally retire at age 60 but often continue to work at the same firm at a lower 
wage. 
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Utilizing the data from the two Economic Censuses, we initially classify firms into four 
types:  domestic-only firms, exporters, Japan-owned MNE (JMNE), and foreign-owned MNE 
(FMNE). Domestic-only firms are locally-owned non-exporters without foreign subsidiaries, 
whereas exporters are locally-owned exporters without foreign subsidiaries. JMNE are locally-
owned firms with foreign subsidiaries which are defined as foreign affiliates that are 50 percent or 
more equity-owned by the JMNE and its other subsidiaries. Finally, FMNE are defined as firms 
for which more than 50 percent of the equity is foreign owned. We conduct robustness tests using 
a 10 percent foreign equity cutoff to check our results. We also separate FMNE based on their 
mode of entry into Greenfield-born FMNE and M&A-born FMNE for further tests. This separation 
is based on the authors’ research into the corporate history of each FMNE to determine whether 
foreign ownership was involved at the time of the firm’s establishment. It should be noted that we 
use the existence of foreign subsidiaries to identify JMNE and the presence of foreign equity 
ownership to identify FMNE, but our wage data is based solely on each establishment’s employees 
in Japan. Therefore, foreigners working in Japan will be included but all employees of JMNE and 
FMNE working outside Japan are excluded. 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the number of firms, plants, workers and wages in the sample by firm type 
using the 50 percent criteria for FMNE.33 Among 7,932 firms, 6,485 firms (82 percent) are 
domestic-only firms. The number of JMNE is 971 (12.2 percent), which is the second largest group. 
The third largest group is exporters, at 437 firms (5.5 percent). The number of majority-owned 
 
33 Table 1 also shows summary statistics for observations using a 10 percent foreign-ownership criteria for defining 
FMNE. This alternate definition will be used later for robustness checks. 
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FMNE is only 39 (0.5 percent), with 20 Greenfield-born and 19 M&A-born FMNE.34 The shares 
of plants by firm type follow the same ranking. 
The tendency for exporters and MNE to be larger than domestic-only firms is confirmed in 
the employment statistics. Domestic-only firms account for 82 percent of firms but only 61 percent 
of employees in our data, while JMNE employ 31 percent, exporters employ 7 percent and FMNE 
employ 1 percent of the 188,787 workers in our dataset. Of the 43,260 female workers in our 
dataset, 70 percent work in domestic-only firms, 23 percent in JMNE, 6 percent in exporters and 
0.7 percent in FMNE. 
 
<Table 1> 
 
Table 1 also provides worker-level descriptive statistics for mean hourly wage by firm type 
and indicates that FMNE tend to pay the highest wages (3170 JPY), followed by JMNE (2760 
JPY), exporters (2150 JPY), and domestic-only firms (1770 JPY) in descending order of wage. 
4 Estimation results 
Table 2 shows regression results for the Mincer wage regression in equation (1) using 
dummy variables for firm types and majority foreign-ownership as the criteria for defining FMNE. 
Industry and region fixed effects are included in all regressions and standard errors are clustered 
at the firm-level. The results in column (1) indicate a large “raw” GWG of 34.0 percent when we 
only control for industry and region fixed effects. 35 In column (2) we reduce the GWG to 27.4 
 
34 It should be noted that the small number of majority-owned FMNE in our employer-employee linked dataset is 
indicative of their scarcity in Japan. Majority-owned FMNE account for only 0.2 percent (or 498) of the 277,066 
total number of manufacturing enterprises included in the The Economic Census for Business Frame in 2009.  
35 Wage premiums for all dummy variables are calculated as exponent(coefficient)-1. 
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percent by adding worker characteristics to the estimation. We next add other plant characteristics 
in column (3) to reduce the GWG to 26.2 percent. The estimated coefficients on the other control 
variables used in Table 2 are significant and have the expected signs with positive values for plant 
size, plant sales per worker, all education dummy variables, experience, tenure, lifetime employee 
and white collar.36 
Column (4) shows the effect of our establishment-type variables on wages and on the GWG. 
The coefficient on Female now represents the average GWG among domestic-only firms, which 
is estimated to be 26.8 percent. This result implies that women earn 26.8 percent less than men 
working in domestic-only firms after controlling for observable plant and worker characteristics. 
Exporters, JMNE and FMNE all pay wage premia (WP) relative to domestic-only firms and 
women receive significantly higher WP than men from these international firm types. Compared 
with domestic-only firms, exporters and JMNE pay modest gender-neutral WP of 2.8 percent and 
7.4 percent, respectively, while majority-owned FMNE pay a large gender-neutral WP of 24.7 
percent. Female workers at these types of firms receive these gender-neutral WP plus added ones 
of 4.2 percent, 2.6 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively. These added WP for female workers 
imply smaller GWGs among these international firms compared with domestic-only firms. The 
GWG is 19.3 percent at FMNE, a 7.5 percentage-point improvement compared with the 26.8 
percent gender wage gap at domestic-only firms. 37 Due to the large gender-neutral WP plus 
female-specific WP associated with working at FMNE, women working at these firms earn 0.6 
percent more than men working at domestic-only firms, after controlling for other plant and worker 
 
36 We find negative but quantitatively very small coefficients for the squares of experience and tenure, and a 
negative small coefficient on the headquarters (HQ) dummy variable. The latter result may reflect that HQ workers 
receive larger non-wage compensation through transportation and housing allowances that are not captured in our 
wage data. Full regression results are suppressed in our tables due to space constraints but are available online here:  
https://sites.google.com/site/greaneyecon/research. 
37 GWG for each international firm type is calculated as exp(Female + Female*EstType) – 1. 
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characteristics. This implies approximate wage parity between a female worker and a male worker 
with similar observable worker, plant, industry and region characteristics except that the woman 
works for an FMNE while the man works at a domestic-only firm. 
 
<Table 2> 
 
In column (5) of Table 2 we separate FMNE based on their mode of market entry and we 
confirm strong differences both in WP and GWG based on entry mode. Greenfield-born FMNE 
pay a much larger gender-neutral WP of 35.5 percent relative to domestic-only firms while M&A-
born FMNE pay a corresponding WP of only 14.7 percent. Of even greater interest, only 
Greenfield-born FMNE are associated with a significant reduction in the GWG, with an estimated 
GWG of 14.9 percent. This implies that the GWG among Greenfield-born FMNE is 11.9 
percentage-points lower than it is among domestic-only firms or among M&A-born FMNE. These 
results support our hypothesis that foreign owners have a greater influence on corporate HRM and 
pay structure when they are involved from the firm’s birth rather than taking control at a later stage 
through M&A.38 
Based on these results, we cannot determine whether Greenfield-born FMNE hire very 
similar workers to other firm types but gender discriminate less in paying them or hire more able 
female workers who only appear similar to those at other firms based on observable characteristics 
that cannot capture ability or ambition. Either interpretation (i.e., pay similar workers more or 
 
38 An alternative hypothesis regarding the wage differences found between Greenfield-born and M&A-born FMNE 
may be that the former tend to be 100 percent foreign-owned while the latter are not. However, the six percentage 
point difference in average foreign equity shares across the two firm types (i.e., 87.8 percent for Greenfield-born 
FMNE versus 81.5 percent for M&A-born FMNE) seems much too small to explain such large differences in WP 
and GWG. 
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employ better workers) supports our hypothesis of the transmission of more gender-equal pay 
structures through Greenfield-born FMNE. In the latter interpretation, the employee-employer 
matching that pairs more able female workers with Greenfield-born FMNE is not random but 
arguably reflects the more gender-equal corporate culture of the foreign-owned firms that deviate 
the most from the local corporate norms of gender inequality.39 Greenfield-born FMNE also may 
be the most likely to deviate from the lifetime employment plus seniority wage system that fails 
to adequately reward merit,40 which implies that more ambitious workers who want a more market-
based, competitive pay structure seek out employment with these foreign-owned firms. The large 
gender-neutral WP at FMNE, and particularly at Greenfield-born ones, supports this hypothesis.41 
In addition, Ono (2007) concludes that workers at foreign firms in Japan have higher levels of 
general human capital and are more likely to have changed jobs in the past, indicating a higher 
mobility of these workers compared with workers in Japanese-owned firms who are less mobile 
in part due to their firm-specific human capital.42 
In Table 3, we use continuous variables rather than dummy variables for each of our 
international firm activities. In column (1) we control for exporting using the export share of sales 
for each establishment. This allows us to control for any WP associated with export-related 
activities by “Exporters” and by MNE, but it changes the reference group to now include both 
 
39 Kodama et al. (2018) cite anecdotal evidence that Japanese women are likely to have better career opportunities 
working in FMNE than in Japanese-owned firms, using evidence from IBM Japan and Nissan Motor Co. following 
its acquisition by Renault. Both firms made substantial increases in their numbers of female managers. 
40 Survey results from 2005 indicate that 67.2 percent of foreign-owned firms reported adopting meritocracy in their 
labor management (i.e., compensation, job assignments and promotions) while only 55.9 percent of Japanese-owned 
firms responded similarly. (The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, “Report on the Survey on Foreign 
Firms Industrial Relations”, Gaishi Kei Kigyo no Roshi Kankei Tou Jittai Chousa Kekka Houkokusyo.) 
41 A reasonable question is whether Japanese job applicants can identify Greenfield-born FMNE relative to other 
types of firms, including M&A-born FMNE, but the corporate name is often a clear indication since foreign names 
are written in “katakana”, a separate Japanese syllabary used specifically for foreign-language words. 
42 Firm-specific human capital is developed through intra-firm training that is typical of the Japanese HRM system 
involving lifetime employment and seniority wages. See Ono (2007) for more details. 
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domestic-only firms and locally-owned exporters without foreign subsidiaries. We find that a 10 
percentage-point increase in export share of sales is associated with a 0.45 percent gender-neutral 
WP and an added 0.68 percent female WP. Greater export intensity corresponds with higher wages 
and lower GWGs. 
 
<Table 3> 
 
The regression results in columns (2) through (4) of Table 3 change our measurement of 
MNE activities to continuous variables and establish that being “more international” as an MNE 
is associated with higher gender-neutral WP for workers but not necessarily smaller gender wage 
gaps. Column (2) results include the log of the number of foreign subsidiaries held by each JMNE 
as a continuous indicator of their international activities. We estimate that a 10 percent increase in 
the number of foreign affiliates for a JMNE corresponds with 0.3 percent gender-neutral WP and 
an additional 0.11 percent WP for women at these firms. In column (3), FMNE are measured using 
the foreign capital ownership ratio, which can vary from 50 percent to 100 percent in this 
specification. A 10 percentage-point increase in the foreign capital ownership ratio of majority-
owned FMNE is associated with a 3 percent gender-neutral WP and an additional 1 percent WP 
for women.43 Column (4) shows our results using the foreign capital ownership ratio again but 
dividing FMNE into those that are Greenfield-born versus M&A-born. The estimated coefficients 
confirm our previous results that Greenfield-born FMNE deviate more than M&A-born FMNE 
from local norms in worker compensation, and we find the deviation increases in the level of 
foreign ownership. Greenfield-born FMNE pay larger gender-neutral WP than M&A-born FMNE 
 
43 Ono and Odaki (2011) also find a 3 percent wage premium associated with a similar increase in foreign equity 
share using 1998 wage data, despite using fewer worker and firm characteristics to control for worker productivity. 
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(i.e., 3 percent versus 2 percent WP, respectively, from a 10 percentage-point increase in the foreign 
capital ownership ratio) and Greenfield-born FMNE are the only ones that pay a significant added 
WP to women (i.e., 2 percent WP from a 10 percentage-point increase in the foreign capital 
ownership ratio). 
In column (5) of Table 3, we include continuous variables for all of our international firm-
type activities. More foreign subsidiaries for JMNE and higher foreign ownership ratios for 
Greenfield-born and M&A-born FMNE generate significant gender-neutral WP while higher 
export shares do not. Higher export shares, more foreign subsidiaries for JMNE and higher foreign 
ownership ratios for Greenfield-born FMNE all correspond with lower GWG. Our results using 
continuous variables show that more international activities tend to generate larger gender-neutral 
and female-specific WP. Our results using both indicator and continuous variables support our 
hypotheses that mode of entry matters for gender wage outcomes and that larger deviations from 
the host-country gender wage outcomes are associated with Greenfield-born rather than M&A-
born FMNE. 
Quantile regression results using the majority-foreign-ownership criteria and controlling 
for both plant and worker characteristics are shown in Table 4. Having established significant 
differences between Greenfield-born and M&A-born FMNE in previous results, we now include 
these two types of FMNE separately in each estimation. The strongest changes across the income 
distribution for our establishment-type variables of interest are for FMNE WP, which increase 
strongly in wage quintiles, particular for Greenfield-born FMNE. The gender-neutral WP 
associated with Greenfield-born FMNE relative to domestic-only firms is 27.0 percent for workers 
in the lowest wage quintile while it is a whopping 41.6 percent for workers in the highest quintile.  
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<Table 4> 
 
The Table 4 results indicate that the additional WP for female workers at Greenfield-born 
FMNE are largest in the middle three quintiles of the wage distribution, while M&A-born FMNE 
pay no significant added WP to women in these wage quintiles. These WP can be used to calculate 
GWGs by firm type, which are presented in Figure 1 across the five wage quintiles. The figure 
clearly shows that Greenfield-born FMNE deviate the most from domestic-only firms in terms of 
having much lower GWGs. Greenfield-born FMNE are associated with 13.2, 16.1 and 12.2 
percentage-point reductions in the GWGs of 26.1 to 26.4 percent prevailing at domestic-only firms 
at the 25th, 50th and 75th wage quintiles, respectively.44 The next highest reductions in GWG at 
these quintiles are only 3.4 to 3.5 percentage-points for exporters.  
 
<Figure 1> 
 
Greenfield-born FMNE are associated with the smallest reduction in GWG at the highest 
income quintile, with a 4.8 percentage-point reduction, but this is still larger than the next highest 
GWG reduction of 3.2 percentage-points for M&A-born FMNE. This may indicate that women 
still face barriers to achieving the highest-paying corporate jobs in Japan, even at FMNE. In this 
context, it is interesting to note that the 30 percent Club Japan was launched on May 1, 2019, with 
the goal of increasing female representation on corporate boards of TOPIX100 companies to 10 
percent by 2020 and to 30 percent by 2030. Of the group’s 36 members thus far, it is noteworthy 
 
44 See Appendix Table A2 to see the gender wage gap differentials for all firm types that correspond with the 
coefficients in Tables 2, 4, 5 and 7. 
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that 14 (i.e., almost 39 percent) are from foreign-owned firms or organizations.45 This suggests 
that gender-based differences between FMNE and Japanese-owned firms in the highest wage 
quintile may continue and even grow in the future as the latter are under-represented in this public 
commitment to corporate change. Overall, the QR results show strong differences between 
Greenfield-born FMNE and M&A-born FMNE with the former contributing much more in terms 
of gender-neutral WP and reductions in the GWG across income quintiles. 
5 Robustness Check: Foreign ownership criteria 
Our results thus far are based on majority-owned FMNE, but the typical cut-off for 
classifying FDI is 10 percent or more foreign ownership of a firm. Therefore, we check the 
robustness of our results by considering a less stringent criteria for defining foreign ownership. 
That is, we lower our criteria from 50 percent to 10 percent minimum foreign equity ownership to 
classify FMNE. This reclassification moves minority-foreign-owned firms (i.e., those with 
foreign-equity ownership of at least 10 percent but less than 50 percent) into the FMNE group and 
out of one of the three domestic-owned firm groups. Summary statistics in Table 1 show that 
FMNE gain a total of 153 firms, or 19,140 workers, with the change from a 50 percent to a 10 
percent cutoff, most of which come from JMNE (135 firms with 18,206 workers), while only a 
handful come from domestic-only firms (10 firms with 646 workers) and exporters (8 firms with 
288 workers). Note that this change in our definition of FMNE to include minority-owned FMNE 
means 11 percent of our sample is now classified as working for FMNE whereas we previously 
had just under 1 percent classified as working for majority-owned FMNE. This expanded 
 
45 Based on 30 percent Club Japan website accessed on July 24, 2019:  
https://30percentclub.org/about/chapters/japan . The 30 percent Club originated in the United Kingdom in 2010, and 
the Japan Chapter was the club’s 14th chapter. 
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definition of FMNE allows us to check our results for the influence of outliers and/or measurement 
errors due to the relatively small number of workers at majority-owned FMNE. 
Table 5 shows the Mincer wage regression results using dummy variables to indicate firm 
type and the 10 percent criteria for defining FMNE and other firm types. The qualitative results of 
interest hold, while quantitatively the WP for FMNE are smaller as anticipated due to the 
reclassification of so many previously-classified JMNE workers who work in minority-owned 
FMNE. Column (4) results show the same firm-type ranking of significant positive WP for women 
that was previously established, going from FMNE (4.5 percent), to exporters (4.0 percent), and 
then JMNE (2.5 percent) all paying women more than they earn in domestic-only firms. Column 
(5) of Table 5 shows results after grouping FMNE by mode of entry. Similar to our previous 
findings, Greenfield-born FMNE are associated with a larger gender-neutral WP of 25.1 percent 
versus only 10.2 percent for M&A-born FMNE. With the 10 percent foreign ownership criteria we 
find that both modes of entry are associated with significant reductions in GWGs. Greenfield-born 
FMNE are associated with a larger reduction in the GWG than M&A-born FMNE which is 
consistent with our prior findings (i.e., 6.5 percentage-points for Greenfield-born FMNE versus 
2.6 percentage points for M&A-born FMNE). 
 
<Table 5> 
 
Next we report the estimation results using continuous variables to measure international 
activities and the 10 percent criteria for defining FMNE in Table 6. The elasticity estimates using 
the various continuous variables are very similar to previous estimates presented in Table 3 using 
the 50 percent criteria for FMNE. As we found previously, the GWG is reduced by increases in 
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export share of sales, JMNE number of foreign subsidiaries and the foreign ownership ratio of 
Greenfield-born, but not M&A-born, FMNE. 
 
<Table 6> 
 
Table 7 reports QR results using the 10 percent foreign-ownership criteria for identifying 
FMNE and the other firm types. As noted previously, QR analysis is more robust than OLS analysis 
to non-normal errors and outliers. The inclusion of minority-owned FMNE makes the previously-
observed strong upward trend in the Greenfield-born FMNE gender-neutral WP disappear, but we 
again see an upward trend until the 50th or 75th percentiles of the wage distribution and then a 
decline in this firm type’s additional WP for women. Greenfield-born FMNE are associated with 
declines in the GWG of 6.2, 12.6 and 8.7 percentage-point at the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of 
the wage distribution, but this firm type is no longer a significant determinant of the GWG at the 
lowest two wage quintiles. M&A-born FMNE are now associated with reductions in the GWG at 
all wage quintiles, with an increasing trend from 1.5 percentage-points at the lowest wage quintile 
to 3.4 percentage-points at the highest wage quintile. Overall, we find that our main results are 
robust in qualitative terms to relaxing the definition of FMNE to include minority-foreign-owned 
firms. This implies that our results are not driven by measurement errors or outliers among the 
relatively small sample of majority-owned FMNE. 
 
<Table 7> 
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6 Conclusions 
Using linked employer-employee data for 2012, we find that FMNE pay the largest gender-
neutral wage premia and they feature the smallest gender wage gaps in Japan compared with 
domestic-only firms, exporters and JMNE. We separate FMNE by their mode of market entry— 
Greenfield-born versus M&A-born—and find that Greenfield-born FMNE deviate the most from 
domestic-only firms in term of wages and gender wage gaps. Separating FMNE by mode of entry 
allows us to address the endogeneity problem, at least for Greenfield-born FMNE, in using cross-
sectional, rather than panel, data for this study. We confirm that the influence of foreign workplace 
gender norms is most apparent at Greenfield-born FMNE, which report a much lower GWG than 
any of our other firm types. Greenfield-born FMNE are associated with a GWG that is almost 12 
percentage-points lower than the 26.8 percent prevailing among domestic-only firms.  
The smaller gender-based pay discrepancy is likely due to both lower levels of gender 
discrimination in pay and unobservable worker quality differences that match more ambitious and 
able female workers with these foreign-owned firms. Greenfield-born FMNE also report the 
highest gender-neutral wage premia (i.e., 35.5 percent) which suggests more ambitious and able 
male workers also may seek employment with these FMNE that are less likely to practice the 
seniority wage plus lifetime employment system of Japanese-owned firms. We interpret the lower 
GWG and higher gender-neutral wage premia associated with Greenfield-born FMNE as being 
caused by foreign influences on a firm’s corporate culture and human resource management. 46 
Admittedly our study would benefit from the availability of panel data that links employer 
and employee observations. That would allow us to control for unobservable worker and plant 
characteristics so that we could more precisely examine the causal links between foreign 
 
46 See Kato and Kodama (2018) for an extensive review of the literature on management practices and gender-based 
outcomes in the workforce, including suggested directions for further research. 
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ownership, multinationality, exporting and worker compensation. Since such data is currently 
unavailable for Japan, our unique approach with cross-sectional data addresses the endogeneity 
issue for a subset of FMNE by separating them by mode of entry. The strong differences found 
between Greenfield-born FMNE and M&A-born FMNE provide support for this approach. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics by firm type
50% criteria
N. of Firms N. of Plants N. of  Employees N. Female Empl Hourly Wage (100 JPY)
Firm type Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Mean Median St Dev Min Max
Domestic-only 6,485 81.8 6,706 76.8 115,931 61.4 30,413 70.3 17.7 15.7 8.6 6.5 171.6
Exporter 437 5.5 478 5.5 12,322 6.5 2,656 6.1 21.5 19.4 10.1 6.6 140.0
JMNE 971 12.2 1,504 17.2 58,797 31.1 9,885 22.9 27.6 25.0 13.4 6.6 162.3
FMNE 39 0.5 45 0.5 1,737 0.9 306 0.7 31.7 27.7 16.5 7.7 144.1
  Greenfield-born 20 0.3 21 0.2 868 0.5 156 0.4 32.6 28.5 16.7 8.3 128.2
   M&A-born 19 0.2 24 0.3 869 0.5 150 0.4 30.8 26.8 16.2 7.7 144.1
Total 7,932 100 8,733 100 188,787 100 43,260 100 21.1 18.3 11.5 6.5 171.6
10% criteria
N. of Firms N. of Plants N. of  Employees N. Female Empl Hourly Wage (100 JPY)
Firm type Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Mean Median St Dev Min Max
Domestic-only 6,475 81.6 6,692 76.6 115,285 61.1 30,327 70.1 17.6 15.7 8.6 6.5 171.6
Exporter 429 5.4 469 5.4 12,034 6.4 2,595 6.0 21.5 19.3 10.1 6.6 140.0
JMNE 836 10.5 1,142 13.1 40,591 21.5 7,470 17.3 25.8 23.2 12.5 6.6 162.3
FMNE 192 2.4 430 4.9 20,877 11.1 2,868 6.6 31.3 28.8 14.5 7.4 161.7
  Greenfield-born 30 0.4 43 0.5 2,070 1.1 338 0.8 29.8 26.7 14.5 7.4 128.2
   M&A-born 162 2.0 387 4.4 18,807 10.0 2,530 5.9 31.5 29.0 14.5 7.4 161.7
Total 7,932 100 8,733 100 188,787 100 43,260 100 21.1 18.3 11.5 6.5 171.6
Notes: 50% criteria and 10% criteria refer to the minimum foreign equity shares used for defining FMNEs relative to other firm types.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.416*** -0.320*** -0.304*** -0.312*** -0.312***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Japanese-Owned Exporters  (50%) 0.028** 0.028**
 without Foreign Subsidiaries [0.011] [0.011]
Female * Japanese-Owned Exporters  (50%) 0.041*** 0.041***
[0.011] [0.011]
JMNE (50%) 0.071*** 0.071***
[0.009] [0.009]
Female * JMNE (50%) 0.026*** 0.026***
[0.008] [0.008]
FMNE (50%) 0.221***
[0.038]
Female * FMNE (50%) 0.097**
[0.040]
Greenfield-born FMNE (50%) 0.304***
[0.046]
Female * Greenfield-born FMNE (50%) 0.151***
[0.035]
M&A-born FMNE (50%) 0.137**
[0.053]
Female * M&A-born FMNE (50%) 0.037
[0.046]
Worker characteristics included No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other plant-level characteristics included No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 200,230 192,917 192,891 182,094 182,094
R-squared 0.299 0.646 0.707 0.712 0.712
Table 2: Wage regressions using 50% foreign ownership criteria and firm-type dummy variables
ln Hourly Wage
Notes: The "50%" indicators are a reminder that all firm-types are defined using that criteria for identifying 
FMNE. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, appear in brackets. Industry and region fixed effects are 
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.310*** -0.311*** -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.309***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Japanese-Owned Exporters  (50%) 0.028** 0.029** 0.028**
 without Foreign Subsidiaries [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Female * Japanese-Owned Exporters  (50%) 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.041***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
JMNE (50%) 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.070***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Female * JMNE (50%) 0.016* 0.025*** 0.026***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008]
FMNE (50%) 0.210*** 0.213***
[0.038] [0.037]
Female * FMNE (50%) 0.090** 0.086**
[0.040] [0.043]
Export Share 0.045* 0.013
[0.027] [0.026]
Female * Export Share 0.068** 0.060**
[0.029] [0.028]
ln N. of Foreign Subsidiaries 0.030*** 0.028***
[0.003] [0.003]
Female * lnN_Foreign_Subsidiaries 0.011*** 0.008***
[0.003] [0.003]
Foreign Ownership Ratio (FOR) 0.003***
[0.000]
Female * Foreign Ownership Ratio 0.001*
[0.000]
Greenfield-born FMNE FOR 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001]
Female * Greenfield-born FMNE FOR 0.002*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
M&A-born FMNE FOR 0.002** 0.001**
[0.001] [0.001]
Female * M&A-born FMNE FOR 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
Worker characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other plant-level characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182,094 182,094 182,094 182,094 182,094
R-squared 0.712 0.713 0.713 0.712 0.713
Table 3: Wage regressions using 50% foreign ownership criteria and firm-type continuous variables
ln Hourly Wage
Notes: The "50%" indicators are a reminder that all firm-types are defined using that criteria for identifying 
FMNE. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, appear in brackets. Industry and region fixed effects are 
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable = Ln Hourly Wage
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Female -0.289*** -0.303*** -0.306*** -0.307*** -0.304***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Japanese-Owned Exporters  (50%) 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.036***
 without Foreign Subsidiaries [0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.005]
Female * J-Owned Exporters (50%) 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.025**
[0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.010]
JMNE (50%) 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.079***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.002]
Female * JMNE (50%) 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.033***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.003] [0.011]
Greenfield-born FMNE (50%) 0.239*** 0.281*** 0.277*** 0.289*** 0.348***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.009] [0.035]
Female * Greenfield-born FMNE (50%) 0.128** 0.165*** 0.198*** 0.153*** 0.063**
[0.057] [0.057] [0.033] [0.019] [0.025]
M&A-born FMNE (50%) 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.148*** 0.186***
[0.011] [0.031] [0.022] [0.027] [0.032]
Female * M&A-born FMNE (50%) 0.036*** 0.028 0.038 0.019 0.043***
[0.013] [0.041] [0.043] [0.047] [0.006]
Worker characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other plant-level characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.4434 0.4737 0.4844 0.4849 0.473
Observations 182,094
Table 4: Wage regressions using 50% foreign ownership criteria and firm-type dummy variables, QR results
Notes: The "50%" indicators are a reminder that all firm-types are defined using that criteria for identifying FMNE. 
Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, appear in brackets. Industry and region fixed effects are suppressed. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.416*** -0.320*** -0.304*** -0.312*** -0.311***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
Japanese-Owned Exporters  (10%) 0.029** 0.028**
 without Foreign Subsidiaries [0.012] [0.012]
Female * Japanese-Owned Exporters  (10%) 0.039*** 0.039***
[0.011] [0.011]
JMNE (10%) 0.068*** 0.066***
[0.009] [0.009]
Female * JMNE (10%) 0.025** 0.025***
[0.010] [0.010]
FMNE (10%) 0.111***
[0.016]
Female * FMNE (10%) 0.044***
[0.012]
Greenfield-born FMNE (10%) 0.224***
[0.035]
Female * Greenfield-born FMNE (10%) 0.086***
[0.031]
M&A-born FMNE (10%) 0.097***
[0.017]
Female * M&A-born FMNE (10%) 0.035***
[0.013]
Worker characteristics included No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other plant-level characteristics included No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 200,230 192,917 192,891 182,094 182,094
R-squared 0.299 0.646 0.707 0.711 0.712
Table 5: Wage regressions using 10% foreign ownership criteria and firm-type dummy variables
ln Hourly Wage
Notes: The "10%" indicators are a reminder that all firm-types are defined using that criteria for identifying 
FMNE. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, appear in brackets. Industry and region fixed effects are 
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.310*** -0.310*** -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.308***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Japanese-Owned Exporters  (10%) 0.023** 0.024** 0.023**
 without Foreign Subsidiaries [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Female * Japanese-Owned Exporters  (10%) 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.040***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
JMNE (10%) 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.057***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Female * JMNE (10%) 0.017 0.026*** 0.026***
[0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
FMNE (10%) 0.101*** 0.029*
[0.017] [0.017]
Female * FMNE (10%) 0.033*** 0.022
[0.012] [0.016]
Export Share 0.038 0.014
[0.027] [0.026]
Female*Export Share 0.060** 0.062**
[0.028] [0.027]
ln N. of Foreign Subsidiaries 0.024*** 0.025***
[0.004] [0.004]
Female*lnN_Foreign_Subsidiaries 0.009*** 0.007**
[0.004] [0.003]
Foreign Ownership Ratio (FOR) 0.003***
[0.000]
Female*Foreign Ownership Ratio 0.001**
[0.000]
Greenfield-born FMNE FOR 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001]
Female*Greenfield-born FMNE FOR 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
M&A-born FMNE FOR 0.003*** 0.001**
[0.000] [0.000]
Female*M&A-born FMNE FOR 0.001 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Worker characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other plant-level characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182,094 182,094 182,094 182,094 182,094
R-squared 0.711 0.711 0.713 0.712 0.713
Table 6: Wage regressions using 10% foreign ownership criteria and firm-type continuous variables
ln Hourly Wage
Notes: The "10%" indicators are a reminder that all firm-types are defined using that criteria for identifying 
FMNE. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, appear in brackets. Industry and region fixed effects are 
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable = Ln Hourly Wage
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Female -0.289*** -0.302*** -0.305*** -0.306*** -0.305***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]
Japanese-Owned Exporters (10%) 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.038***
 without Foreign Subsidiaries [0.007] [0.004] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004]
Female * J-Owned Exporters (10%) 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.022
[0.001] [0.012] [0.006] [0.016] [0.017]
JMNE (10%) 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.074***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003]
Female * JMNE (10%) 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.032***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009]
Greenfield-born FMNE (10%) 0.206*** 0.204*** 0.199*** 0.191*** 0.198***
[0.011] [0.010] [0.007] [0.004] [0.008]
Female * Greenfield-born FMNE (10%) 0.017 0.007 0.081* 0.158*** 0.111***
[0.011] [0.036] [0.044] [0.031] [0.012]
M&A-born FMNE (10%) 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.095*** 0.100*** 0.104***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004]
Female * M&A-born FMNE (10%) 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.035** 0.045**
[0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.016] [0.022]
Worker characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other plant-level characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.4439 0.474 0.4845 0.4848 0.4725
Observations 182,094
Table 7: Wage regressions using 10% foreign ownership ratio criteria and firm-type dummy variables, QR results
Notes: The "10%" indicators are a reminder that all firm-types are defined using that criteria for identifying FMNE. 
Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, appear in brackets. Industry and region fixed effects are suppressed. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Notes: Based on authors' QR results in Table 4.
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Figure 1: Gender wage gaps by frm type using 50% foreign ownership criteria
Domestic-only Exporter JMME Greenfield-born FMNE M&A-born FMNE
APPENDIX TABLES AND FIGURE  
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
AVAILABLE ONLINE AS INDICATED IN THE MANUSCRIPT 
Basic Survey on Wage Structure (2012)
https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/wage-structure.html
• Annual sample survey. Repeated cross-sectional data.
• All industries (1,276,813 workers in 57,078 establishments). Manufacturing (272,624 workers in 10,604 
establishments)
• We have 2009—2012 data but matching with the two censuses is successful for 2012 data only.
2009 Economic Census for Business Frame
https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/e-census/index.html
• First complete census, followed by the 2014 one.
• No. of foreign subsidiaries. Foreign ownership ratio. 
• Establishment-Firm concordances. 7,271,801 establishments of 6,104,514 firms in all 
industries.
2012 Economic Census for Business Activity
https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/e-census/2012/index.html
• First complete census, followed by the 2016 one. 
• The response rate is over 80%. It covers establishments’ and firms’ activites during 2011. 
Questionnaires vary across industries. We use manufacturing industries to merge the data on 
exports. 
• 440,562 establishments of 398,608 firms in manufacturing.
The merged data (2012, manufacturing)
• Restricted to full-time workers under 60 years old in private manufacturing plants only. Exclude outliers whose 
wage exceeds average plus 10 standard deviations. Exclude outliers whose wage is below minimum wage at 
prefecture level (1,079 workers).
è200,230 workers (154,067 male + 46,163 female workers) in 9,420 establishments of 8,614 firms in manufacturing. 
188,787 workers (145,527 male + 43,260 female workers) in firms with data on no. of foreign subsidiaries and exports.
Perfect match
For 2012 data
9,564 of 10,604
establishments 
and 243,173 of 
272,624 workers
are matched.
(89% of workers,
90% of plants.)
Matching using the establishment ID of the 2009 Economic Census for Business Frame
Appendix Figure A1: Data flow chart
Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max
Ln Wage 3.030 0.458 1.878 5.145 2.564 0.402 1.875 5.019
Domestic-only 0.555 0.497 0 1 0.659 0.474 0 1
Exporter 0.063 0.242 0 1 0.058 0.233 0 1
JMNE 0.335 0.472 0 1 0.228 0.420 0 1
FMNE (50% criteria) 0.010 0.099 0 1 0.007 0.084 0 1
Jr High School 0.039 0.194 0 1 0.050 0.217 0 1
High School 0.635 0.481 0 1 0.709 0.454 0 1
Jr College 0.083 0.275 0 1 0.145 0.352 0 1
College 0.244 0.429 0 1 0.096 0.295 0 1
Experience 20.477 10.983 0 44 21.673 11.668 0 44
Tenure 13.474 10.819 0 44 10.699 9.331 0 44
Employee for an Indefinite Period 0.943 0.232 0 1 0.814 0.389 0 1
White Collar 0.363 0.481 0 1 0.395 0.489 0 1
Blue Collar 0.613 0.487 0 1 0.582 0.493 0 1
ln Plant Size (ln N. of Employees) 4.917 1.558 1.609 9.468 4.586 1.379 1.609 9.468
Headquarters 0.252 0.434 0 1 0.266 0.442 0 1
ln Plant Sales per Worker 7.213 2.398 0 12.407 6.798 2.324 0 12.407
Observations 154,067 46,163
Notes: Employee for an Indefinite Period indicates a long-term or "lifetime" employee of the firm.
Male Workers Female Workers
Appendix Table A1: Summary statistics by worker gender
Appendix Table A2: Gender wage gaps and differentials by firm type and wage quintile
Baseline GWG Significant differentials from baseline (percentage points)
FMNE criteria Quintile Domestic-only Exporter JMME
Greenfield-born 
FMNE
M&A-born 
FMNE
50% criteria All -26.8 3.1 1.9 11.9 0.0
50% criteria q10 -25.1 3.1 0.8 10.2 2.7
50% criteria q25 -26.1 3.5 1.8 13.2 0.0
50% criteria q50 -26.4 3.4 1.7 16.1 0.0
50% criteria q75 -26.4 3.5 2.0 12.2 0.0
50% criteria q90 -26.2 1.9 2.5 4.8 3.2
10% criteria All -26.8 2.9 1.9 6.5 2.6
10% criteria q10 -25.1 3.1 0.8 0.0 1.5
10% criteria q25 -26.1 3.5 1.4 0.0 2.4
10% criteria q50 -26.3 3.2 1.8 6.2 2.2
10% criteria q75 -26.4 3.1 2.4 12.6 2.6
10% criteria q90 -26.3 0.0 2.4 8.7 3.4
Notes: Based on estimated coefficients in Tables 2, 5 and 7; zero indicates no significant difference.
